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DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND DIPLOMATIC
CRIME: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CURTAIL
ABUSES*
INTRODUCTION
There are few areas of the American justice system in more desperate need
of reform than its method of dealing with the legal abuses of persons protected
by diplomatic immunity. The time has come for the United States to take a
strong moral stand and put an end to this era of flagrant abuse of diplomatic
privileges by substantially changing the law of diplomatic immunity. It can be
done. The timing is perfect, and the United States has the mechanisms to reform
its system.' Diplomatic immunity has been a perennial problem in Washington,
D.C., and New York, and has involved everything from traffic and parking
violations to assault, rape and murder. 2
One particularly egregious example occurred in Washington, D.C., on the
morning of February 13, 1987. A car driven by the ambassador from Papua
New Guinea crashed into four parked cars and seriously injured Stephen Hagan,
a twenty-six year old radio newsman, who was sitting in one of the cars.' A
friend of Hagan's, seated next to him in the automobile, also sustained minor
head injuries. 4 A preliminary review indicated that the ambassador was drunk at
the time of the accident. 5 The police and State Department officials stated that
the city could not prosecute the ambassador because he had diplomatic immunity. 6
Consequently, the ambassador returned home without receiving punishment for
his reckless disregard of American law. 7 This is only one of many examples of
the often outrageous crimes that diplomats commit every day, both in the United
States and abroad.8
This note examines whether the age-old theories behind diplomatic immunity
have kept pace with the realities of modern diplomacy. In doing so, this note
* The author wishes to give special thanks to Professors Barbara J. Fick and Tang Thi Thanh
Trai Le of the Notre Dame Law School for their guidance in writing this piece.
1. C. ASHMAN & P. TREscOTT, DIPLOMATIC CRIME: DRUGS, KILLINGS, THEFTS, RAPES, SLAVERY &
OTHER OUTRAGEOUS CRIMES 347 (1987).
2. Id.
3. Envoy's Car Slams into 4 Vehicles, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1987, at BI, col. 6; Caplan, Crash
of Envoy's Car Focuses Attention on International Law, Legal Times, May 4, 1987, at 20.
4. Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1987, supra note 3, at Bl, col. 6.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Papua New Guinea Recalls Diplomat, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1987, at Bl, col. 1. James E.
Nolan, director of the State Department's Office of Foreign Missions, stated that his aides
had contacted the U.S. attorney's office after the accident "to urge a complete investigation"
and to notify government prosecutors of "the potential for bringing charges" despite the
ambassador's diplomatic immunity under international law. Nolan added that this intervention
was due to the State Department's policy of notifying local law enforcement officials of
government interest in a thorough investigation in cases of serious violations of U.S. law by
foreign diplomats. Id.
8. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTT, supra note 1, at 1.
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pays particular attention to the criminal aspect of abuses of diplomatic immunity.
The note first examines the history of diplomatic immunity and outlines the
theories behind this doctrine. Next, the note analyzes the current abuses of this
doctrine in order to demonstrate the severity of this problem. Finally, the note
looks at the relationship between domestic law and international law and proposes
model provisions to guide legislators in their efforts to adequately balance the
rights of American citizens and the necessities of international diplomacy. 9
I. HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Diplomatic immunity, a fundamental principle of international law, shields
members of a diplomatic mission and their families and servants from a state's
legal process.' 0 This shield consists of the freedom from local jurisdiction as
accorded under international law."
Diplomatic immunity is among the most ancient doctrines of international
law.' 2 It arose because, during the periods of both peace and war, protecting the
rights of international representatives was vital for preserving the lines of inter-
national communication. 3 Initially, the practice of stationing diplomatic repre-
sentatives abroad developed under the Roman states, the Asian states, the Greek
city-states, and the Islamic countries of West Asia. 14 These ancient governments
sent proxies to represent their nations on a nonpermanent basis, and, while in
residence, these envoys enjoyed complete personal inviolability. 5 The modern
body of diplomatic privileges and immunities is a product of the establishment
of permanent diplomatic missions.16 As the maintenance of permanent diplomatic
missions became advantageous, the law of diplomatic privileges and immunities
remained customary. 7 Changes in the law only began to appear in the late
nineteenth century.' 8 Many countries signed treaties with respect to their diplo-
matic relations, but these treaties did not give any long-range, comprehensive
guidelines.' 9 In 1924, the League of Nations recognized that diplomatic privileges
9. Caplan, supra note 3, at 21. The legislators must be aware of the fear of reciprocal actions
against American diplomats abroad. The possibility of retaliatory actions against American
diplomats could easily frustrate the effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic missions.
10. C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIS at vii (1967). Comment, A New Regime
of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 54 TUL. L. REV. 661, 662
(1980) [hereinafter New Regime].
11. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, reprinted in REPORT
ON LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979). See
also Comment, Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction: Essential to Effective Inter-
national Relations, 7 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Com'. L. J. 113 (1984) [hereinafter Diplomatic
Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction].
12. C. WILSON, supra note 10, at vii (Preface).
13. Id. at 1.
14. B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 3-4 (1965); see also
Comment, State-Sponsored Terrorism: Libya's Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities,
5 DICK. L. REV. 133, 136 (1986) [hereinafter State-Sponsored Terrorism].
15. B. SEN, supra note 14, at 10.
16. Young, The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations, 40 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 147
(1964).
17. See generally B. SEN, supra note 14, at 23.
18. Young, supra note 16, at 150.
19. Id. at 157.
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and immunities required international regulation or control; however, no action
was taken. 20
Finally, in 1961, the United Nations codified the customary international
law regarding the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents in the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations ("Vienna Convention"). 2 The Vienna Con-
vention incorporated clearly established rules of diplomatic immunity and added
to established law by filling in any gaps where international practice was uncertain
or inconsistent. 22 The Vienna Convention is a comprehensive multilateral codifi-
cation of the privileges and immunities extended to members of permanent
diplomatic missions and their families, and constitutes the modern law of dip-
lomatic privileges and immunities. 23 The Vienna Convention is universally accepted
as the binding international law of diplomatic relations. The Convention extends
the same privileges and immunities to nonsignatory nations as to signatory
nations .2
II. THE THEORIES UNDERLYING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Legal scholars have offered many theories to justify diplomatic immunity.
For example, at one time diplomatic immunity was justified as a consequence of
the "Sacredness of Ambassadors. ' 25 This justification is no longer valid, since
bare status will not protect individuals from the consequences of their actions. 26
In addition to the "Sacredness of Ambassadors" theory, the most prominent
theories underlying diplomatic immunity have been the following: (1) personal
representation, (2) exterritoriality27 and (3) functional necessity. 28
20. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 14. See State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 14, at
137.
21. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No.
7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United States ratified the Vienna
Convention on September 14, 1965; the ratification was deposited on November 13, 1972, and
the Vienna Convention entered into force in the United States on December 13, 1972. The
U.S. Senate's ratification appears at 111 CONG. Rc. 23,773 (1965).
22. E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW 1 (1976).
23. E. SATOW, SATOW's GUIDE To DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 106 (5th ed. 1979).
24. As of December 31, 1977, 127 states had deposited instruments of ratification of or accession
to the Vienna Convention with the U.N. Secretary General. United Nations Multilateral Treaties:
List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions as of December 31, 1977, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.D/lI 51 (1977). Currently, as of March 31, 1989, 152 nations have ratified or acceded
to the Vienna Convention. Telephone interview with Evelyn Kiss, Legal Assistant, International
Law, Treaty Section, Depository Functions Division of the United Nations (Mar. 31, 1989);
see E. DENZA, supra, note 22, at 135. Note, The Diplomatic Relations Act: The U.S. Protects
Its Own, 5 BROOKLYN L. REV. 379, 384 (1979).
25. H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACs 201 (W. WHEWELL trans. 1853). Grotius is recognized
as the father of international law, and in his 1625 publication, DE Juax BELLI ET PACTS, he
stated: "There are two maxims in the law of nations relating to ambassadors which are
generally accepted as established rule: The first that ambassadors must be received and second
that they must suffer no harm." Id. at 203. See also Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal
Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 664.
26. See Lauterpacht, The Codification of the Law of Diplomatic Immunity, 40 THE GROTIUS
SOCIETY 65, 71 (1954).
27. The terms "exterritoriality" and "extraterritoriality" have traditionally been used interchange-
ably when referring to this theory of diplomatic immunity. However, the more cumbersome
of the two terms, "extraterritoriality," is becoming obsolete and the modern trend is toward
use of the shorter version, or "exterritoriality." C. WILSON, supra note 10, at 5.
28. Id. at 1. See also M. OGDON, JURIDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 63-194 (1936)(for a
detailed and excellent discussion of the development and status of these three theories).
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The personal representation theory was very popular during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. 29 Under this theory, the diplomat is considered the
"alter ego" of his ruler;30 therefore, he enjoys the rights and privileges that
would be accorded to his ruler by the receiving state.3 Scholars no longer consider
the personal representation theory to be a valid justification for diplomatic
immunity. 32 The theory has been sharply attacked for being too broad, thereby
placing the diplomat beyond the receiving state's law.33 In addition, the theory
is inadequate to determine the extent of immunities within modern systems of
governments,3 4 because the theory provides full immunity for any personal
representative of the sending states without considering the scope of their authority
within the receiving state. Lastly, the scope of the personal representation theory
is too broad, since it does not distinguish between the private and the official
acts of diplomats. 3
The exterritoriality theory was also used during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries to justify diplomatic immunity.3 6 This theory refers either to the concept
of residence or to the concept of territory.37 The rationale behind this theory was
that a diplomat should be considered within his home state's territory because
29. M. OGDON, supra note 28, at 63-67. See Note, The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 and its
Consequences, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 131, 132 (1978) [hereinafter Consequences].
30. C. WILSON, supra note 10, at 3. Bergman v. de Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1946),
aff'd, 170 F. 2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948). In Bergman, the court stated, "[A] foreign minister is
immune from the jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, of the courts in the country to which
he is accredited, on the grounds that he is the representative, the alter ego, of his sovereign
who is, of course, entitled to such immunity" (emphasis added).
31. Holbrook v. Henderson, 4 Sand. Ch. 619, 628 (1839). In Holbrook, the court stated,"[T]he
respect rendered the minister is not personal, merely, but is in truth, the respect due from one
sovereign to another .. " Cf. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (Cranch) 116
(1812). In The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall stated the rationale for the personal
representation theory: "The assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive
exemptions from territorial jurisdiction which are admitted to attach to foreign ministers, is
implied from the considerations that, without such exemption, every sovereign would hazard
his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad . Id. at 138.
32. C. WILSON, supra note 10, at 4.
33. RIEFF, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES, AND PRACTICE 26 (1954). Note,
Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189, 198 (1972) [hereinafter
Terrorist Kidnapping].
34. In the modern democratic nation-state, the authority is vested in the people and this authority
is shared by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Therefore, under the personal
representation theory, it is difficult to assess the status of a diplomat. C. WILSON, supra note
10, at 4. In addition, the United States did not have any ambassadors until the late nineteenth
century since "there was the feeling that ambassadors, personal representatives of monarchs,
ill-befitted the simple social democracy of America." M. OGDON, supra note 28, at 144.
35. Preuss, Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical Basis for Diplomatic Immunities, 10
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 170, 179-181 (1932). Professor Preuss reasoned that the personal represen-
tation theory offers no theoretical basis for exemptions enjoyed by diplomats for their private
acts. Commentators tend to agree that the primary purpose of diplomatic immunity is to
facilitate international discourse. Therefore, the scope of such immunity should be narrowly
drawn to govern activities promoting this specific purpose rather than extended, in a blanket
fashion, to cover all of the diplomat's activities in the receiving state. The personal represen-
tation theory fails to limit the scope of diplomatic immunity adequately.
36. C. WILSON, supra note 10, at 5; see also E. ADAIR, THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF AMBASSADORS
IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 25-28 (1929); Diplomatic Immunity From
Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 116-17.
37. C. WILSON, supra note 10, at 5.
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he is acting on behalf of his country.3" Consequently, the host state lacks personal
jurisdiction over the diplomat and cannot compel him to appear in its courts.3 9
Another view states that the diplomat is not subject to local law, because he is
considered a resident of the sending state.4
This theory has also been widely attacked.4 ' First, the term is subject to a
wide variety of definitions, which have made it meaningless and artificial in
providing guidelines for diplomatic immunity.4 2 Secondly, many legal scholars
claimed that exterritoriality was a mere fiction, since it assumes that diplomatic
immunity is based on the independence of nations. In reality, the question of
immunity arises not with respect to the independence of nations, but to the
interdependence between nations.4 3 Finally, the acceptance of this theory could
result in dangerous consequences, since it provides unlimited privileges and
immunities that would be beyond the actual privileges and immunities reasonably
necessary for diplomats."Both theories of exterritoriality and personal representation define the scope
of diplomatic immunity too broadly, since the immunity is stated in terms of
individuals and not functions. Consequently, the current justification for diplo-
matic immunity relies upon the theory of functional necessity. 4 This theory
justifies the grant of immunity to a diplomatic mission and its members only
when it is functionally necessary to facilitate and protect the performance of
their representative duties." The theory is premised on the fact that a diplomat
38. Wilson v. Blanco, 56 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 582, 4 N.Y.S. 714 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889). In Wilson,
Justice O'Gorman stated that the rule of international law "derives support from the legal
fiction that an ambassador is not an inhabitant of the country to which he is accredited, but
of the country of his origin and whose sovereign he represents, and within whose territory, in
contemplation of law, he always resides." 56 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 582, 4 N.Y.S. at 714. Justice
O'Gorman's view has been followed in The King v. Guerchy, 1 Black. W. 545, 96 Eng. Rep.
315 (1965); Taylor v. Best, 14 C.B. 487, 517, 139 Eng. Rep. 201, 213 (1854).
39. Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity form Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development under
International Law and Application in United States Practice, 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 173, 175
(1960).
40. C. WILSON, supra note !0, at 5-6.
41. Note, Ambassadors and Consuls Privileges, Immunities and Disabilities, 25 Cm.[-]KENT L.
REV. 329, 333 (1947) (this note suggests that the theory is no longer applicable due to the
changes in diplomatic functions over time). See M. OGDON, supra note 28, at 94 (author states
that the "recent and current trend is conclusively in favor of repudiating the extraterritorial
concept in every form"). See also 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED
AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1266 (2d rev. ed. 1947) (Hyde refers to "complete
abandonment" of the theory).
42. D. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 47 (1971). See E. ADAIR, supra note
36, at 28; see also C. WI.SON, supra note 10, at 12 (where the author analyzes the various
meanings of exterritoriality).
43. D. MICHAELS, supra note 42, at 49. It is impossible to interpret exterritoriality strictly according
to its literal meaning. It also is impossible to agree upon one of the other meanings which
have become part of the vocabulary of international law. The term is a metaphor-some have
said a "picturesque metaphor"-and not a legal fact, and should be discarded when determining
the immunities of the different diplomatic classes. C. WI.SON, supra note 10, at 13.
44. M. OGDON, supra note 28, at 101. This theory treats all diplomats as residents of the sending
state; therefore, all diplomats are granted the same immunities without regard to their official
position within the receiving state. D. MICHAELS, supra note 42, at 49.
45. See D. MICHAELS, supra note 42, at 49.
46. Report of International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 9) 11, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 230, 266 (1959). See
also Preuss, supra note 35, at 182-83.
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must be immune from the enforcement jurisdiction of the receiving state in order
to function efficiently. 47 The functional necessity theory places its emphasis on
the functions appropriately served by the foreign diplomats, rather than empha-
sizing the centralized figure of the diplomat encountered under both the exterri-
toriality and personal representation theories.4 1
Legal scholars have criticized the functional necessity theory as being "dis-
turbingly vague", since it does not draw any guidelines for limiting the extension
of immunities, 49 nor does it explain what is regarded as a necessary function of
a diplomat.5 0 The theory has been further criticized for implying that diplomats
engage in illegal or injurious activity, since they require immunity to function
properly.5 Although the functional necessity theory has some detractors, it is
currently the best theory underlying diplomatic immunity. The functional necessity
theroy is less vague than other theories, and it does not extend a blanket immunity
to diplomats.5 2
47. See Note, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending The Vienna Convention to Deter
Violent Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 177, 200-01 (1987)[hereinafter Restricting Diplomatic
Immunity]. See Hurst, Diplomatic Immunities-Modern Developments, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
13 (1929). Hurst stated:
[Tihe purpose for which these immunities are recognized is to enable the members of
a foreign mission to act effectively as the representatives of their sovereign in the
maintenance of relations with the sovereign to whom they are accredited, not to enable
them to fulfill tasks lying outside that primary function.
Id.
48. C. WILSON, supra note 10, at 17-19. See Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction,
supra note 11, at 118. By focusing on the functions served by diplomats, the functional
necessity theory will not grant immunity to diplomats' unofficial activities.
49. C. WILsoN, supra note 10, at 22.
50. Id.
51. New Regime, supra note 10, at 662-63.
52. C. WILsoN, supra note 10, at 17-25; Terrorist Kidnapping, supra note 33, at 199-200. The
functional necessity theory has allowed states under the Vienna Convention to restrict the scope
of diplomatic immunity to a much greater extent than permitted under exterritoriality. Under
the Vienna Convention, article 31(l)(a)-(c), states may bring civil actions against diplomats.
Since the trend has been toward narrower immunity, a continuation of this functional necessity
theory should be expected. In addition, article 37 of the Vienna Convention contains the four
possible status classifications of embassy employees and family members and their immunities:
1. The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household
shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and
immunities specified in [a]rticles 29 to 36.
2. Members of the [aidministrative and [tiechnical staff of the mission, together with
members of their families forming part of their respective households, shall if they
are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges
and immunities specified in [alrticles 29 to 35, except that the immunity from civil
and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State specified in paragraph I of
[alrticle 31 shall not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duties.
They shall also enjoy the privileges specified in [a]rticle 36, paragraph 1, in respect
of articles imported at the time of first installation.
3. Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals of or permanently
resident in the receiving State shall enjoy immunity in respect of acts performed in
the course of their duties, exemption from dues and taxes on the emoluments they
receive by reason of their employment and the exemption contained in [alrticle 33.
4. Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not nationals of or
permanently resident in the receiving State, be exempt from dues and taxes on the
emoluments they receive by reason of their employment. In other respects, they may
enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted by the receiving State.
However, the receiving State must exercise its jurisdiction over those persons in such
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III. THE APPLICATION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION
The Vienna Convention is a comprehensive formulation of diplomatic law.53
This multilateral codification of the many divergent rules of state practices covers
every point on which a legal rule existed, thereby harmonizing the different
practices of diplomatic relations.5 4 The Vienna Convention contains fifty-three
articles that govern every aspect of diplomatic immunity. 5 These articles regulate
the process for accreditation of ambassadors,5 6 exemption from local taxation,5 7
the inviolability of mission premises,5" and even the use of flags on diplomatic
vehicles.5 9 The drafters of the Vienna Convention justified such diplomatic
privileges and immunities upon the functional necessity theory.6 The abuses of
diplomatic immunity have been concentrated within the following three sections:
the diplomat, the mission, and diplomatic correspondence, better known as the
"diplomatic bag.'"61
Articles 29 through 32 of the Vienna Convention apply when diplomatic
immunity is abused. Article 29 provides that the diplomat shall be inviolable and
is not liable to any form of arrest or detention. 62 Article 30 provides that the
private residence of the diplomat shall be inviolable. 63 Article 31 exempts the
diplomat from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state, 64 although the
diplomat can be prosecuted in the receiving state if his immunity is waived by
a manner as not to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions of the
mission.
Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 37.
53. E. DENZA, supra note 22, at 3.
54. Id.
55. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 21.
56. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at arts. 5, 6, 7.
57. Id. at arts. 23, 38, 34.
58. Id. at art. 22. The inviolability also extends to the mission's cars; however, the cars may be
towed away by a receiving state. See E. DENZA, supra note 22, at 90.
59. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 20. See Note, Insuring Against Abuses of Diplomatic
Immunity, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1517, 1522 (1986) [hereinafter Insuring Against Abuses].
60. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at Preamble; see E. DENZA, supra note 22, at 8. In drafting
the Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission stated explicitly in the commentary
on a draft convention its intent to use the functional necessity theory. Report of the International
Law Commission on its l0th Session, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/
3859 (1958).
61. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text. See Insuring Against Abuses, supra note 59, at
1522-23.
62. Id. at 1522. Article 29 also states: "The receiving state shall treat the diplomats with due
respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or
dignity." Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 29.
63. In addition, article 30 provides inviolability to the diplomat's papers, correspondence, and
property except as otherwise provided in article 31. Id. at art. 30.
64. Id. Article 31 immunizes diplomats against the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state, with three exceptions:
1) A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving state, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of
the mission.
2) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending
state.
3) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.
Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 31(l)(a)-(c).
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the sending state65 or in his home state.66 Article 32 covers the procedure for
waiver of immunity. This article states that only the sending state may waive
immunity and that such a waiver must be expressly conveyed to the receiving
state. Article 41 requires that the diplomat respect the laws and regulations of
the receiving state, and prohibits him from interfering in the internal affairs of
the receiving state. Article 41 is essentially unenforceable because the previous
three articles immunize the diplomat from the jurisdiction of the receiving state. 67
Consequently, these articles provide a safe-conduct for diplomats.6
Similar to the diplomat, the mission itself is inviolable. Article 22 forbids local
authorities to enter embassy grounds without the invitation of the head of the
mission. 69 In addition, article 24 specifically states that the archives and documents
of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be. 70
Article 27 sets forth the procedures for handling the diplomatic bag. This
article states that the "diplomatic bag must bear visible external marks of their
[sic] character and may contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended
for official use." ' 7' Subsection 27(3) further states that "the diplomatic bag shall
not be opened or detained." 72
The availability of these immunities, coupled with the increasing number of
diplomats in the United States73, has led to the large number of abuses of
65. Id. at art. 32.
66. Id. at art. 31(4).
67. Insuring Against Abuses, supra note 59, at 1522.
68. Article 30 addresses the inviolability of the residence and property of the diplomat. Vienna
Convention, supra note 21, at art. 30. See Insuring Against Abuses, supra note 59, at 1522.
69. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 22.
70. Id. at art. 24. The Convention's drafters left the term "archives" undefined but, in view of
the diversity of modern methods of recording and storing information, it is important that the
term should be given a wide construction. E. DENZA, supra note 22, at 110.
71. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 27(4). While the official papers of the mission are
inviolable, the receiving state may search the ambassador's personal luggage. However, as a
rule of courtesy, the receiving state does not search the ambassador's luggage. See E. SATOW,
supra note 23, at 117. The Vienna Convention created a more absolute protection for the
diplomatic bag than had ever existed under the previous customary law. Originally, two
attempts were made to codify the divergent rules of diplomatic law. They were the Havana
Convention on Diplomatic Officers in 1928, and the Harvard Research Draft Convention on
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities in 1932. See Research in International Law, 26 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 50 (1932).
72. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 27(3). The drafters of the Vienna Convention faced
some difficulty in balancing the opposing considerations of protection for diplomatic com-
munications and safeguards against possible abuses by the receiving state. By drafting article
27 paragraphs (3) and (4), they shifted this balance in favor of greater protection for the
diplomatic bag. E. DENZA, supra note 22, at 125.
73. More than 118,000 persons in the United States are entitled to some degree of special privilege
under international law. OFF. OF PROTOCOL & OFF. OF FOR. MISSIONS, GUIDANCE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS: PERS. RTs. & IMMUNITIES OF FOR. DIPLOMATIC & CONSULAR PERSONNEL
I (State Dep't Publication No. 9533, 1987). In Washington, D.C., there are about 27,000
diplomats with criminal immunity, and in New York, there are about 10,000 diplomats with
criminal immunity. See Appendix. Moreover, there are countries with which the United States
has concluded treaties extending broader immunities for consular personnel. These bilateral
agreements include the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), Bulgaria, the
German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Philippines.
American consular employees in the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. have full criminal immunity,
and the United States is obligated to provide the same immunities to consular employees of
those nations. BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., OFF. OF PUB. COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT
POLICY No. 993: DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND U.S. INTERESTS 2-3 (August 5, 1987); see also
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diplomatic privileges and immunities.7 4 Even when a diplomat breaks the
law, 7 no matter how severe the crime, Article 9 is the receiving state's only
available recourse. Article 9 allows the receiving state, at any time and without
explanation, to notify the sending state that its ambassador or his employees are
persona non grata.76 Once notified, the sending state must either recall the
diplomat or terminate his functions with the mission. 77
IV. CURRENT ABUSES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Current abuses of diplomatic immunity can be divided into three categories:
1) the commission of violent crimes by diplomats; 78 2) the illegal use of the
diplomatic bag; 79 and 3) the promotion of state terrorism by foreign governments
through the involvement of their embassies in the receiving state. s0 Many nations
have been plagued by diplomats abusing their privileges and immunities; however,
the United States has seen a larger share of these abuses than most nations, since
foreign diplomats are stationed both in New York, which hosts the members of
the United Nations, and Washington, D.C., which contains the embassies of all
our diplomatic friends.
The following incidents demonstrate the broad scope of diplomats' criminal
activities. As these examples show, the problem of diplomatic abuse is a global
problem that must be attacked by joint international cooperation.
One of the most publicized recent incidents of abuse of diplomatic immunity
was the 1984 shooting of policewoman Yvonne Fletcher in front of the London
Libyan "People's Bureau" in St. James' Square.8' On April 17, 1984, Libyan
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, STUDY AND REPORT CONCERNING THE STATUS OF INDMDUALS WITH
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 43-52 (Mar. 18, 1988).
74. See generally C. ASHMAN & P. TREscoTT, supra note 1. This book relates many incidents in
which rapes, brutal beatings, drug smuggling, killing and many other crimes have been
uncovered with sufficient evidence to mount successful court actions; yet, in almost every
instance, the guilty diplomats have walked free because of diplomatic immunity.
75. American diplomats have a great record of following the receiving state's laws. Comment, The
Effect of The Diplomatic Relations Act, II CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 354, 374 (1981)[hereinafter
Diplomatic Relations Act]. The United States instills the importance of the nonabuse of
diplomatic privileges and immunities in its personnel, as provided in Section 225.1 of the
Foreign Affairs Manual. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL § 225.1 (1987).
76. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 9. The problem with the enforcement of article 9
is the issue of reciprocity. Once the United States declares a diplomat persona non grata, in
almost every instance the sending state will retaliate by declaring one of the U.S. diplomats
persona non grata. See B. SEN, supra note 14, at 192-93.
77. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 9. Another option available to the sending state is
to waive the immunity of its representatives, but this option is usually not exercised, since the
sending state would rather prosecute its nationals itself.
78. See generally C. ASHMAN & P. TREscoTT, supra note 1, at 22-190.
79. Id. at 190-224.
80. The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom Experience, 79
Am. J. INT'L L. 641, 643 (1985) [hereinafter Recent Experience]. See generally State-Sponsored
Terrorism, supra note 14, at 133.(close attention to the Appendix, which contains a chronology
of Libyan support for terrorism from 1979-1985). Libya has been responsible for many terrorist
activities. Goldberg, The Shoot-Out at the Libyan Self-Styled People's Bureau: A Case of
State-Supported International Terrorism, 30 S.D.L. REv. 1, 7 (1984) [hereinafter The Shoot-
Out]. See also U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE BUREAU OF PUB. Asp., LIBYA UNDER QADDAFI: A PATTERN
OF AGGRESSION, SPFCIAL REP. No. 138, at 6 (Jan. 1986)[hereinafter QADDAFI].
81. On February 18, 1984, Libyan students, allegedly with the support of Col. Muammar Qaddafi,
took control of the Libyan embassy and renamed it the "Libyan People's Bureau." Timetable
of Past Incidents, The Times (London), Apr. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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opponents of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's government held an orderly demon-
stration in front of the "People's Bureau. '8 2 Libya had warned both the foreign
office in London and the British ambassador in Tripoli that if the demonstration
were allowed, Libya "would not be responsible for its consequences." 83 Without
warning, submachine gunfire from the embassy struck the crowd. The gunfire
killed Constable Fletcher and wounded eleven others.8 4 The Libyan government
claimed diplomatic immunity for its nationals within the Libyan embassy.85 The
British government's only remedy under the Vienna Convention was to declare
the Libyan diplomats persona non grata and to expel them from Great Britain.8 6
Later, Great Britain severed diplomatic ties with Libya. 7
Perhaps the most outrageous exploitation of the diplomatic bag is the case
of Alhaji Umaru Dikko, the former Nigerian minister of transportation. While
in Great Britain, in July of 1984, Dikko was kidnapped, drugged, manacled, and
placed inside a crate addressed to the Ministry of External Affairs, Federal
Republic of Nigeria.88 In addition to Dikko, the crates contained the Israeli
mercenaries who had kidnapped him. An attache of the Nigerian high commission
accompanied the crates.8 9 Since the crates did not have any official markings or
an official seal, as required by Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, 9° the customs
officers opened the crates and discovered Dikko and the mercenaries. 91 The
Nigerian government refused to waive immunity for their attache; therefore, once
again, the only option for Great Britain was to declare the attache persona non
grata and to expel him. 92 These are only a few of the many attempts to use the
diplomatic bag for abduction purposes. 93
82. The Times (London), Apr. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
83. Recent Experience, supra note 80, at 643.
84. Nordheimer, Gunmen in London in Libyan Embassy Fires into Crowd, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18,
1984, at A, col. 6; Hamilton, London Embassy Shots Kill Policewoman, The Times (London),
Apr. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
85. Taylor, Laws Restrict British Action against Libya, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1984, at A5, col. 1.
86. Apple, Libyans Leave Embassy in Britain and Fly Home, Ending Seige, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28,
1984, at A, col. 3. Apple, The London Embassy Seige: Unheeded Warnings?, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 30, 1984, at A6, col. 4. In retaliation for the expulsion of its nationals, the Libyan
government ordered its police to besiege the British embassy in Tripoli, and 35 people, including
the British ambassador, were held within the embassy. Apple, Libyans Permit Britons to Leave
Tripoli Embassy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1984, at Al, col. 2; Stanhope, Diplomats Released
From Tripoli Embassy Detention, The Times (London), Apr. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
87. Great Britain officially broke diplomatic relations with Libya on April 22, 1984. Feder, British
Break off Libyan Relations over London Seige, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at Al, col. 6;
Stanhope, Libyans Given a Week to Leave Britain, The Times (London), Apr. 23, 1984, at 1,
col. 2. The Qaddafi government welcomed home the Libyan embassy staff upon their arrival
at Tripoli. Libyans Receive a Vociferous Welcome Home, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1984, at A3,
col. 1.
88. C. ASHMAN & P. Ts~scorr, supra note 1, at 204-05. The Times (London), July 7, 1984, at 1,
col. 2.
89. The Times (London), July 13, 1984, at 1, col. 6 and July 27, 1984, at 3, col. 2.
90. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
91. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTT, supra note 1, at 204-08.
92. In retaliation, the Nigerian government detained a British Caledonian airplane and expelled
two British diplomats. The Times (London), July 7, 1984, at 1, col. 5 and July 13, 1984, at
1, col. 6.
93. In one incident, customs authorities in Rome realized that a large diplomatic "bag" destined
for Cairo was emitting moans. The authorities seized and opened the bag and found that it
contained a drugged Israeli who had been kidnapped. E. SATOW, supra note 23, at 117. The
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The United States has had its shares of violent diplomatic crimes, such as
rape, theft, murder, slavery and drug dealing. 94 On May 25, 1985, the chancellor
at the Belgian embassy in New Delhi, India, entered New York's La Guardia
airport. He was carrying a large green canvas bag bearing the Belgian seal;
therefore, the bag was considered an official diplomatic bag and immune from
search.9 The next day, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration apprehended
the chancellor in a "sting" operation. He was arrested and detained for smuggling
twenty-two pounds of pure heroin, with a street value in excess of $40 million,
into the United States.9 6 Another example of blatant abuse of diplomatic immunity
is the case of Manuel Ayree, the nineteen-year old son of the third attache to
the Ghanaian delegation.9 7 Ayree allegedly committed rape, sodomy, assault and
an array of other crimes during his stay in New York City during 1980 and 1981.
The New York police arrested Ayree for the alleged rapes of two women. Both
women positively identified Ayree as their rapist, but the police released Manuel
due to his diplomatic immunity. The State Department's only remedy was to
declare Ayree persona non grata and expel him from the United States.9 Later,
one of the women stated, "A man raped me and he got away with it, because
he is not a citizen and because he is a relative of a diplomat. He claimed he has
the right to rape me and I, as an American citizen, am not given the right to
get justice."
crate had been specially fitted out to contain a human body. It was lined with leather, had a
small chair, a helmet for the head, and metal clamps for the ankles and neck. Apparently, the
crate had been used in the past. The Times (London), July 7, 1984, at 2, col. 6. The managing
director of Nigerian airways was also rumored to have left London in a crate. Id., Sept. 1,
1984, at 1, col. 5.
94. See generally C. ASHMAN & P. TRscor, supra note 1.
95. One incident of smuggling drugs in a diplomatic bag occurred in July of 1980. A clerk stationed
at the Moroccan embassy in Pakistan was caught smuggling $975,000 of marijuana at the port
of Harwich in Great Britain. The marijuana was placed inside several large crates, which were
marked "diplomatic household effects" and were addressed to the Moroccan embassy in
London. During his trial, the clerk testified that he was a courier for a Pakistani drug ring
that used only diplomats to ship its drugs. They shipped heroin and marijuana around the
world under the diplomatic seal. Cloug, Untouchable Diplomatic Bags, The Times (London),
Apr. 24, 1984, at 2, col. 4.
96. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 1, at 165-66. The Belgian chancellor tried to claim
diplomatic immunity, but, because he was not accredited to the United States, he was not
entitled to immunity on United States soil. He entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to
six years in prison.
The incident demonstrates how easy is it for diplomats to smuggle drugs, or other
contraband, into the United States under the guise of diplomatic immunity. Such conduct must
be of great concern to the American drug enforcement agencies in their battle against drug
traffickers. Authors Ashman and Trescott stated this problem well:
A diplomatic passport is usually the magic wand through customs. Usually diplomats
are simply waved through with few formalities, their personal luggage almost never
subjected to inspection. Diplomats can also carry larger containers into a country under
diplomatic seal which, under the Vienna Convention, cannot be opened at all, only sent
back to the originating country if they are suspected of containing contraband. For
most drug traffickers who are caught, the penalties are severe. But for those with
diplomatic immunity, the worst that can happen is a loss of face and possible expulsion
from their country's diplomatic service. More and more diplomats seem ready to take
that risk, in light of the potential rewards.
Id. at 171.
97. Id. at 22-51.
98. Id.
99. New York City police detective Sgt. Pete Christiansen was in charge of both women's cases.
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Finally, in November 1982, Frank Sanchez, the son of the Brazilian ambas-
sador in Washington, D.C., assaulted and shot the bouncer of a nightclub, Kenny
Skeen. Again, the State Department's only remedy was to expel Sanchez due to
his diplomatic immunity. Skeen was left with large medical bills, while his assailant
walked free.lca
These incidents demonstrate both the severity of the abuse of diplomatic
immunity and that the only remedies available to the receiving state and its
citizens are to expel the diplomat or to sever diplomatic relations. The Vienna
Convention simply places the diplomats beyond the law of the receiving state
and leaves them without fear of punishment for their actions. 10 1 Consequently,
diplomats will continue to abuse their status in order to gain considerable profits
or simply to carry out their violent behavior. Once a diplomat commits any
wrong, he must be made aware that he is not above the law and that he will be
prosecuted for his actions. 10 2 The following section discusses the different means
available to address this problem, including an examination of the interaction of
domestic and international law.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING THE VIENNA CONVENTION
As the incidents in the preceding section demonstrate, diplomatic immunity
has too often become a convenient vehicle for abuse. Foreign diplomats have
After Ayree was released because of his diplomatic immunity, Christiansen stated:
Thesituation was particularly heartbreaking, because the two complainants were there
and I know we had this guy dead to rights, that there was no way he would walk
away. But he did it and there was absolutely nothing I could do about it. We could
not even hold him long enough to put him in a lineup for enough of the women, we
could have closed a couple of dozen files, but we couldn't.
Id. at 51.
In another incident, a high school sophomore was raped by two of her classmates who
were the sons of a Saudi Arabian diplomat and an Egyptian official at the World Bank. Both
boys evaded prosecution because of diplomatic immunity. Id. at 54-64.
100. Kenny filed suit against the ambassador and Brazil, but all charges were dismissed on grounds
of diplomatic immunity. Skeen v. Federative Rep. of Brazil, 506 F. Supp. 1414, 1420 (D.D.C.
1983).
101. William Macomber, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, stated that "[diplomatic immunity is
not a license to commit a wrong and those who use it as such abuse the hospitality which has
been extended to them [andl strain rather than improve relations." Kenneth Turan goes on to
say that "the hard facts remain that abuse of the privilege is an all-too-common fact of life."
Turan, The Devilish Demand of Diplomatic Immunity, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1976, at 6, col.
1. See also Gupte, Privileges for Diplomats Stir Resentment and may be Curbed, N.Y. Times,
July 18, 1978, § II, at 8, col. 4.
102. The only recent case in which a foreign government has waived the immunity of one of its
diplomats did not involve the application of the Vienna Convention, but, instead, involved
two countries purposefully avoiding the Treaty and settling the dispute through independent
negotiation. On January 8, 1989, Rudy Van Den Borre, a 25-year old soldier assigned as a
clerk at the Belgian Embassy in Washington, D.C., confessed to the murders of Michael J.
Egan, a gay airline reservations clerk, and Gerald Simons, a gay cab driver, within 20 hours
of each other. Van Den Borre told the police that the murders were a form of revenge against
his former homosexual partner. Noting that Van Den Borre was entitled to immunity from
criminal prosecution under international law, the State Department requested a total immunity
waiver in this case. Consequently, the Belgian government waived diplomatic immunity for
Van Den Borre, while in return, the U.S. prosecutors agreed not to seek the death penalty
against Van Den Borre. Richard Gookin, associate chief of protocol for the U.S. State
Department, stated that if Van Den Borre is convicted of first-degree murder, he will be the
first person with diplomatic immunity to be convicted of murder in the United States.
United Press International, Regional News, Belgian Government Waives Diplomatic Im-
munity for Murder Suspect (Feb. 2, 1989, BC Cycle)(LExIs, Nexis library wires file).
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been titled "the most elite of the human species." 103 In order to curb these abuses
and to reduce public pressure, the U.S. Congress enacted the Diplomatic Relations
Act of 1978.'1 The Act was passed to clarify and reform the conflicting American
laws of diplomatic immunity. The law also decreased the number of diplomats
in United States entitled to diplomatic immunity.""° Moreover, the Act assisted
in reducing hostilities exhibited by American citizens toward diplomats'06 by
allowing personal recourse by individual citizens against diplomatic tortfeasors.1 7
In the United States, as far as the interaction between domestic and inter-
national law is concerned, the Constitution is the supreme law of land.108 All
acts of Congress and treaties of the United States are inferior to the Constitution.
A statute inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid; however, a treaty incon-
sistent with the Constitution may be valid internationally, but will not be enforced
as law in the United States.'09
The language of the supremacy clause of the Constitution "0 implies that
treaties and laws of the United States are of equal status and authority, and are
supreme over state law."' In case of an inconsistency between a statute and a
103. Anderson & Whitlen, The Diplomatic Immunity Charade, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1975, § C, at
18, col. 1.
104. Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978) (codified at 22
U.S.C § 254(a-e), 28 U.S.C. § 1364)[hereinafter Act]. The Act took effect on December 29,
1978, ninety days after its enactment on September 30, 1979. The Act brought the United
States' law of diplomatic immunity into the twentieth century by superseding the preexisting
federal statute on diplomatic immunity (the Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25-27, 1 Stat.
112, 117-18) (amended by 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-254 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
105. Act, supra note 104, at § 254(a); the Act follows a "functional necessity theory," thereby
granting immunity based on the diplomats' capacity within the embassy. Therefore, only the
highest ranking diplomats have complete immunity, while lower ranking diplomats have limited
immunity.
106. One incident was the severe beating of a Liberian diplomat by a gang of youths in New York
City in 1973. Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1978, at 17, col. 1.
107. Act, supra, note 104, at § 254(e). In addition, the Act contains a direct-action statute, which
allows the victims to directly proceed against the insurance company of a diplomat. Id. at
§ 1364. The Supreme Court endorsed the validity of the direct-action statute in Watson v.
Employers Liability Corp., 348 U.S. 88 (1954). The Act allows the President to establish the
minimal amount of required insurance coverage. Id. at § 254(e)(b). These insurance requirements
are implemented within the Department of State's regulations on liability insurance. Compulsory
Liability Insurance for Diplomatic Missions and Personnel, 22 C.F.R. § 151 (1978).
As of February 21, 1989, the Office of Foreign Missions of the Department of State
proposed to amend 22 C.F.R. § 151.4, which sets minimum limits of liability for motor-vehicle
insurance of foreign diplomatic missions. The State Department proposed to change the
minimum limits from "not less than $300,000 combined single limit for all bodily injury
liability and property damage liability arising from a single incident," to "not less than
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per incident for bodily injury liability and $100,000 per
incident for property damage or $300,000 combined single limit for all bodily injury liability
arising from a single incident." Compulsory Liability Insurance for Diplomatic Missions and
Personnel, 54 Fed. Reg. 7449 (1989) (proposed Feb. 21, 1989).
108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721, comment
a and reporter's note 1 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 3RD]. In Reid, Judge Black held
constitutional prohibitions apply to acts of the United States abroad as well as at home, for,
wherever the United States acts, "it can only act in accordance with the limitations imposed
by the Constitution." Reid v. Colvert, 354 U.S. 6, 77 (1957).
110. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
111. The Supreme Court established the relationship between statutes and treaties about one hundred
years ago. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,779)
(Curtis, Circuit Justice), aff'd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862). Justice Curtis' opinion was cited
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treaty, the judicial and legislative branches will give effect to the one later in
time.'' 2
Due to the ineffectiveness of the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978,11 in
reducing the abuse of diplomatic immunity, the United States Congress has been
reviewing legislation to try to balance the equities of diplomatic immunity with
the interests of American citizens. These efforts have not had much success. 114
Due to the sensitivity of the issues underlying diplomatic immunity, a unilateral
action by the United States, as opposed to a multilateral action by convention
of signatories, would send a negative message to both signatory and nonsignatory
nations, and would lead to retaliatory actions against American diplomats abroad." 5
Consequently, this note recommends that the President seek amendment of the
most abused articles of the Vienna Convention." 6 In order for any amendments
to the articles to be effective, all signatory nations to the Convention must agree
to the amendments and must unite to face the problem of abuse of diplomatic
immunity.
This proposal focuses on amendments needed to end the criminal abuse of
diplomatic immunity. The proposal is divided into three categories: 1) the criminal
acts of diplomats; 2) the abuse of the diplomatic bag and 3) the use of the
mission to support terrorism. These recommendations concentrate on limiting the
scope of immunity granted to diplomats in order to protect American citizens.
with approval by the Supreme Court in both the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597-98
(1884), and the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889).
112. See L. HENKIN, FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1975). See also Diggs v.
Shultz, 470 F. 2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Comm. of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F. 2d 929, 936-37 (D.C. Cir. 1988). RESTATEMENT 3RD, supra note 109, at § 115, comment
a and reporter's note 1. See generally Henkin, International Law As Law in the United States,
82 MIcH. L. REv. 1555 (1984) (for a complete analysis of international law in relation to
domestic U.S. law).
113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. The Diplomatic Relations Act has had limited
success, but it still allows for abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities. See generally
Diplomatic Relations Act, supra note 75; New Regime, supra note 10, at 662-68.
114. S. 339, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), was introduced by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) to protect
the internal security of the United States against international terrorism by making the use of
a firearm to commit a felony by foreign diplomats in the United States a federal felony.
Whoever violates the section shall be punishable by a fine of $10,000 or by imprisonment for
ten years or both. Also, an accompanying Senate Resolution urged the President to pursue
renegotiation of the Vienna Convention in order to incorporate the bill into the Vienna
Convention. S. Res. 74, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
Sen. Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.) introduced a bill to make certain members of foreign diplomatic
missions and consular posts in the United States subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the
United States for crimes of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code),
for drug trafficking, or for reckless driving, driving while intoxicated, or driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. S. 1437, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987).
Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) introduced another bill to provide redress for crimes
committed by diplomats. The bill provided for the increase of minimum insurance coverage
carried by diplomats to $1,000,000 per incident and the review of the treatment accorded to
diplomatic bags by the President of the United States. H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
115. The possibility of retaliation by foreign nations is very real, especially when, in a number of
countries like Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, treaties prevail over incon-
sistent statutes, even when the treaties are signed earlier in time. In Italy and Germany,
customary international law takes precedence over domestic legislation, even if the latter is
later in time. See Sasse, The Common Market: Between International and Municipal Law, 75
YALE L.J. 695, 742-53 (1966).
116. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
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Initially, the basic premise behind any treaty must be a good faith effort by
all parties involved to abide by the treaty and honor all of its articles. All of the
nations involved must abide by the spirit of the articles of the Vienna Convention
in order for the amendments to be effective in reducing the abuse of the diplomatic
privileges.
A. Criminal Acts
The first stage of this proposal is meant to limit the criminal immunity of
diplomats. In order to achieve this end, there must be international agreement
on a list of criminal acts that all nations would exempt from the rules of
diplomatic immunity. The list could be labelled the "universal crimes list."" 7
The proscribed conduct should include all violent behavior against another person,
such as murder, assault, battery and drunk driving." 8 Acts done in self-defense
would be exempt from this list. In addition, property crimes would be placed on
the universal crimes list."19 Diplomats should retain immunity to parking and
traffic violations, since the receiving state could easily harass diplomats through
excessively strict enforcement of motor vehicle regulations.120 The next phase
would be the process of adjudicating the offenses committed by diplomats. 2
Signatory nations must make it clear that once a diplomat commits a crime
proscribed by the universal crimes list, the receiving state would have jurisdiction
to adjudicate the case in accordance with local law.' 22 Once diplomats are aware
that the receiving state can criminally prosecute them for their criminal acts, it
is highly probable that such criminal activity would be reduced.
B. Diplomatic Bag
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention must also be amended in order to
reduce the abuse of diplomatic bag. 2 1 Currently, the diplomatic bag provides
diplomats with a license to smuggle drugs, guns and even people. 24 First, the
Convention should be amended to limit the diplomatic bag to a standard size.
This standard size should allow the diplomats to carry their confidential, official
documents without interference from the host nation. Moreover, special consid-
erations should be made for embassy equipment or items of such nature, whereby
117. The crimes included within the "universal crimes list" should be those crimes that have occurred
repeatedly and that are so egregious that they offend common notions of morality.
118. See Restricting Diplomatic Immunity, supra note 47, at 184.
119. Id.
120. The current system for parking and traffic tickets should be left alone since, under the current
point system, diplomats are adequately monitored. Under the system, the State Department
assesses points for traffic infractions using standards set by the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators, and if any diplomat, during a two year period, accrues eight or more
points, the State Department reviews whether driving privileges should continue or should be
suspended. See Brown, Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice Under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, 37 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 53, 81-83.
121. One writer proposes an international adjudicatory mechanism called the "Permanent Interna-
tional Diplomatic Criminal Court," to adjudicate diplomats who commit crimes. Restricting
Diplomatic Immunity, supra note 47, at 185.
122. The fear of being subject to the local jurisdiction of the receiving state should help to deter
criminal activity by diplomats. Id. at 184.
123. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
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the host nation can make special arrangements to search such items. Second, the
host nation must be allowed to use electronic scanning or remote examination
by equipment or dogs. Third, if the receiving state has strong doubts as to the
contents of the bag, then it should be entitled to request the search of the bag
in the presence of an official representative of the sending state, and if the
diplomat refuses to allow the search, the receiving state should be allowed to
require the return of the diplomatic bag to the sending state. 125 Lastly, if any
diplomat is apprehended for abusing the diplomatic bag, the receiving state
should have jurisdiction to prosecute that diplomat to the full extent of the law.
These proposed amendments to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention should
provide the adequate enforcement mechanism necessary to reduce the abuse of
diplomatic bag.
C. The Mission
Article 22 of the Vienna Convention provides that "[tihe premises of the
mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving state may not enter them,
except with the consent of the head of the mission.' 1 26 In addition, the premises
of the mission are immune from requisition, attachment or execution.1 27 Although
the original drafters of the Vienna Convention felt that inviolability had to be
absolute in order to prevent abuses by the receiving state, 28 it seems that the
increasing use of embassy premises for terrorism requires the amendment of this
article. 29 As far as the embassy is concerned, Article 22 must be amended to
include the following language: First, the alleged crime connected to the embassy
personnel must be proscribed by the "universal crimes list" in order for the
receiving state to have the authority to require the search of the embassy
premises. 30 Second, the receiving state must show "probable cause"'' as to the
questionable conduct within the embassy. If these requirements are met, the
receiving state's officials, accompanied by selected representatives of other sig-
natory nations, must be allowed to search the embassy.3 2 The standard to be
applied in identifying "probable cause" requires the receiving state to show that
embassy grounds contain: 1) property constituting evidence of the commission of
a criminal offense; 2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise
125. This safeguard is similar to that found in article 35(3) of the Convention on Consular Relations.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 (1963).
126. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, at art. 22. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. E. DENZA, supra note 22, at 80.
129. See generally The Shoot-Out, supra note 80, at 1.
130. Under the customary international law, an embassy is viewed as an extension of the sending
state's territory; thereby, a search of the embassy grounds by the receiving state could be
considered an invasion of the sending state's territory. By creating the "universal crimes list,"
if the crime committed is contained in this list, the receiving state would be justified in invading
the sending state's territory in order to protect its citizens and to combat international terrorism.
131. The requirement of probable cause should be the same standard applied for federal search
warrants. Because there is a high burden of proof to establish probable cause, its application
should balance the interests of the receiving state and the sending state. FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(b).
132. The presence of neutral parties during the search of the embassy should be helpful in reducing
the possibility of abuse by the receiving state. Also, the sending state's official documents
would be protected by the presence of the neutral parties.
Diplomatic Immunity
criminally possessed; 3) property designated or intended for use, or which is
being or has been used, as the means of committing a criminal offense or 4) a
person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained. 3 1
In addition, the host nation must show a nexus between items to be searched
and criminal behavior.'34 Although the possibility for abuse by the receiving state
is high, it must be remembered that the premise behind the Vienna Convention
is the good faith efforts of the signatory nations in the implementation and the
enforcement of the Vienna Convention.
Finally, the proposal should include a clear message from the United States
to the other nations that if, after the enactment of these amendments, diplomats
continue to abuse their privileges and immunities, then the United States will not
hesitate to use the ultimate sanction, which is to break off diplomatic relations
entirely with the sending state. Diplomatic personnel must learn to obey and
follow the laws of the receiving state. If the sending state cannot control its own
diplomats then "they must suffer the consequences of not being able to deal
with civilized nations.""'
VI. CONCLUSION
The shortcomings of diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention are
apparent. This proposal sets forth attempts to remedy these shortcomings yet
safeguard the age-old principles of diplomatic immunity. It is obvious that these
age-old principles of diplomatic immunity cannot cope with the current changes
in the diplomatic process. The main problem with the Vienna Convention is the
overbroad scope of the immunity that it has created. Diplomatic immunity under
the Convention is broad because the immunity is stated in terms of individuals
and not functions, thereby shielding many unnecessary diplomatic functions from
prosecution. This overbroad immunity must be restricted.
This proposal attempts to diminish the current problems of abuse of diplo-
matic immunity in three ways. First, it allows for criminal prosecution of
diplomats who commit violent criminal acts within the receiving state. Second,
the proposal calls for specific size requirements of diplomatic bags and the
allowance of electronic scanning of these bags. Lastly, the diplomatic mission of
the sending state could be searched if the receiving state meets the requisite
burden of proof.
The proposal set forth herein is compatible with both the theory underlying
diplomatic immunity and the intent of the drafters of the Vienna Convention.
In addition, the changes in the diplomatic world and the increasing number of
diplomats in the United States requires this type of solution. By amending the
Vienna Convention, the United States could provide specific solutions to the
133. See Gaffney, The Warrant Requirement (Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
U.S. Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 1986-1987) 76 GEO. L.J. 541, 542 (1988).
134. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)(for a discussion of nexus).
135. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTT, supra note 1, at 348. For an example of nations breaking
diplomatic relations, see 53 B.Y.I.L. 417 (1982)(U.K. break with Argentina after invasion of
Falkland Islands); 55 B.Y..I.L. 459 (1984)(U.K. break with Libya after "People's Bureau"




abuse of diplomatic immunity, while keeping international channels of commu-
nication open and free from interference.
Ali M. Farahmand*
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